JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
IL Union Impact on Earnings and Market Value
Union bargaining power allows rank-and-file to appropriate (tax) some share of a firm's returns from market power and special advantages, and the quasi-rents that make up the normal returns to fixed tangible and intangible capital. Unions have some degree of monopoly power owing to the costly substitution of a nonunion for union workforce (due, for example, to firm-specific skills) and the requirement of good faith bargaining mandated by U.S. labor law. Union bargaining power is constrained by the level and elasticity of labor demand, although bargaining outcomes need not be on the demand curve, and by the legal rules and enforcement surrounding Abowd (1989) and Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1989) utilize a firm coverage measure calculated by matching data on union contract settlements to Compustat data on the parent companies. It is difficult to estimate accurately the extent of coverage with contract data, however, since the data on contracts are incomplete (e.g., they include only large contracts), matching is tedious (there are no common identifier codes), and coverage from multi-employer contracts cannot be easily allocated among firms. (Abowd, 1989) .
Regardless of the nature of union settlements or the sources from which unions appropriate rents, union bargaining power implies that profitability will be lower among union than among similar nonunion firms.2 Following all long-run adjustments, "marginal" union and nonunion companies must have equivalent risk-adjusted profit rates. But given some level of new union organizing, unionized companies will have lower average profit rates at any point in time than their nonunion counterparts. Firms differ as well in the cost of deterring union organizing (or of decertifying existing unions). Therefore, "inframarginal" firms will have different profit rates; those with low deterrence costs will be nonunion and have higher profitability, while those with high deterrence costs will be unionized and have lower profitability (Lazear, 1983) . Moreover, unions can appropriate rents for long periods if capital is long-lived and nontransferable, if returns (prior to the union tax) emanating from market power are sustainable, and if substitution of production from union to nonunion plants is costly.
The union tax on company earnings implies that accounting profit rates will be lower among union than among similar nonunion firms. Lower present and future earnings in turn lowers the market value of the firm until investors' expected (risk-adjusted) return on investment is equivalent across union and nonunion companies. Market value measures of profitability such as Tobin's q (the ratio of firm market value to the replacement cost of tangible assets) thus should be lower in union than in nonunion companies.3 Competitive forces eventually must narrow the profitability gap between union and nonunion companies or there will be a decline in the size of the union sector. The decline results because of lower employment and investment among unionized companies, and because the cost of deterring union organizing in new plants (firms) is low relative to the cost of decertifying unions in existing organized plants (firms).
III. Data and Descriptive Evidence
Studies using industry union data fail to account for the considerable intraindustry variation in coverage and entangle to an unknown degree union and industry effects on profitability. In order to obtain information on company coverage, a survey of U. (Clark, 1984) . Extant evidence suggests that union productivity effects on average are close to zero, positive effects that exist may be in response to decreased profitability, and positive productivity effects are not generally sufficient to offset union wage increases (Addison and Hirsch, 1989) . 3 The rate of return on equity, measured by current earnings divided by the equity value of the firm, does not differ greatly between union and nonunion companies since union coverage lowers both the numerator and denominator. This ratio can differ with respect to union status, however, owing to differences in systematic risk (Becker and Olson, 1989) , debt financing (Bronars and Deere, forthcoming), and life-cycle earnings patterns among companies with equivalent present values. Table 1 presents descriptive evidence on firms' rate of return and market valuation of assets over the 1972-80 period, cross-tabulated by union status. Total sample sizes are less than 9 times 705 owing to missing data. "Nonunion" is defined as firms with no union coverage, "low" union as covered firms with less than 30% coverage, "medium" union as firms with coverage of at least 30% but less than 60%, and "high" union as firms with coverage 60% or higher. Tobin's q, measuring the ratio of firm market value to the replacement cost of company assets, decreases substantially as one moves from the nonunion to high union categories. A similar although less marked pattern is found for the rate of return to capital, measured by gross net earnings divided by the gross capital stock. Average q among unionized companies during the 1972-80 period 4 No significant response bias is found in the survey. The 1972 data were provided by David C. Hershfield, who developed the figures from data collected in a 1972 survey by the Conference Board (details available on request). Results are highly similar when the analysis is restricted to those companies for which a direct 1977 union measure is available. Coverage across all classes of workers, rather than just among production workers, was deemed the appropriate measure since it accounts for interfirm differences in the number of and coverage among nonproduction workers. Whereas the union coverage variable is defined for North American operations, all other firm data reflect worldwide operations. Subsequent conclusions should be qualified in light of this limitation.
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is 43% lower than among the nonunion companies; the corresponding figure of 17k is 27%.
IV. Union Effects on Profitability: Specification and Results
Profitability equations using the natural logarithm of Tobin's q (ln(q)) and the rate of return on capital (irk) as dependent variables are estimated.5 The variable 17k measures realized annual earnings relative to an asset base, whereas the market value measure q is forward-looking, reflects expected performance over time rather than accounting performance for a single period, measures risk-adjusted returns, and is less likely to be affected by differences in accounting procedures across firms. Company earnings (present and future) reflect the difference between revenues and costs; thus, ln(q) and Vk are determined by factors affecting prices, production, and costs. A simple form of a profit equation is Estimation of (1) results in an error term that is serially correlated across years within firms, since unmeasured firm-specific profit determinants in year t are likely to be positively correlated with such determinants in year t -1. Although coefficient estimates from (1) need not be biased, standard errors will be biased downward. In order to purge the model of positively correlated errors, a two-step model is estimated. In the first step, profitability is regressed on all timevarying profit determinants, plus 705 firm dummy variables (the intercept is suppressed). In the second-step, the coefficients on the firm dummies, measuring firm fixed effects "averaged" over 6 Regression results from specifications including interactions between UN and variables in X and Z are provided in Hirsch (1990; 1991) . Such specifications allow inferences to be made about the sources from which unions appropriate rents. Analysis in Hirsch (1990) provides no support for the hypothesis that monopoly rents associated with industry concentration and firm market share provide sources for union gains (see Clark, 1984; Salinger, 1984; Karier, 1985; and Hirsch and Connolly, 1987) . Evidence provided in Hirsch (1991) suggests that unions appropriate quasi-rents associated with fixed long-lived tangible and intangible capital and engage in rent sharing of profits (and losses) associated with disequilibria and changes in demand. pretation of the second-step union coefficient u' in (3) is analogous to interpretation of 4i from (1).
Firm-level variables included in X' are firm size (L), capital intensity (K/L), R & D intensity
(R&D/S), advertising intensity (ADVIS), and logarithmic sales growth (GROWTH) (firm-years for which GROWTH is less than -1.0 or greater than 1.0 are excluded from the sample). (1) or (2), based on the 1972-80 sample of firm-years, nor discuss the relationship of firm profitability with firm and industry variables other than unionization (full results are available on request). It is worth noting, however, that union profit effect estimates qi from OLS estimation of (1) are larger (in absolute value) than are estimates from (3), and estimates are substantially larger when we do not account for firm-specific growth and industry control variables. Table 2 provides the second-step WLS regression results from equation (3), where firm dummy coefficients from the first-step ln(q) and Xrk regressions are the dependent variables. As a measure of firm-level union coverage, we use not only UN, measuring the proportion of a firm's workforce covered by a collective bargaining agreement, but also dummies representing low, medium, and high union coverage, with nonunion the excluded category. The results indicate clearly that unionized companies have significantly lower market valuation of assets and profit rates than similar nonunion companies. Coefficient estimates from specifications (1) and (1') indicate that q and irk are lower by an average 12.4% and 9.2%, respectively, in an average unionized firm (with UN = 0.43) than in a similiar nonunion firm.7 The coefficients on the union coverage dummies indicate that union profitability effects vary continuously with the extent of firm coverage. We find union-nonunion differentials in q of -4.5%, -14.7%, and -19.5% for companies with low, medium, and high union coverage, respectively, and differentials in 'irk of -8.7%, -12.6%, and -18.5%.
Industry-level variables in Z' are industry sales growth (I-GROWTH), concentration (I-CR), and import penetration (I-IMPORT). Included in the second-step regression are firm means over time of the variables in X' and Z', firm union coverage (UN), industry union density (I-UN), company age (AGE), and industry dummies (IND). A data appendix provides definitions for all variables. It is not possible to present complete regression results from OLS estimation of equations
It is worth noting that industry union coverage, I-UN, has no significant independent effect on profitability, after accounting for firm-level coverage. The effect of industry coverage is indeterminate, a priori. On the one hand, industry coverage might reduce industry output and raise price, thus increasing company earnings (holding constant firm coverage). On the other hand, industry coverage may proxy union power and the threat 
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of union organizing, thus raising current and future wage costs for union and nonunion firms.8 A potential problem in the preceding analysis is that of simultaneity between union coverage and profitability, wherein the level of firm coverage is influenced by firm profitability (Voos and Mishel, 1986). On the one hand, union organizing is likely to be more successful among firms with larger monopoly profits and quasi-rents from which unions can appropriate gains. If higher profits lead to greater union coverage, the negative effect of unionization on profitability may be understated using OLS estimation. On the other hand, workers may be more inclined to vote for union representation in low-profit firms that treat workers opportunistically. Because we are measuring existing levels of firm coverage rather than current union organizing or changes in coverage, however, simultaneity may be less serious a problem than commonly thought. That is, existing levels of coverage have been determined well in the past and may be only weakly affected by current firm profitability. Attempts here to deal with simultaneity, while not completely satisfactory, suggest that the union profit effect is more deleterious than indicated by our reported estimates.
A related concern is that despite the inclusion of detailed control variables in our regressions, there may be omitted determinants of profitability correlated with the union coverage variable. A potential method to account for omitted variable bias is the use of a fixed-effects or difference model, wherein changes in profitability are estimated as a function of changes in union coverage. But such estimation is not possible here, since union coverage is measured only for 1977.9 A final potential bias is that of selectivity. Companies realizing lower rates of profit may contract in size and be less likely to survive over time. Therefore, our sample of firms would not include companies for which the union impact on earnings has been most deleterious. Estimates of the union tax on profits thus would provide biased estimates of unionism's true impact on a representative firm. o
V. Union Profitability Effects by Year and Industry
Neither intertemporal nor interindustry differences in union profit effects have been examined previously. Union-nonunion differences in profitability across broad industry categories are estimated by of negative union effects is found in foods, chemicals, rubber and plastics, primary metals, nonelectric machinery, and lumber and paper.1' It is difficult, however, to discern clear-cut patterns in the estimated industry effects. Factors that might explain or be correlated with differences in union power and wage premiums-industry concentration, import penetration, firm capital intensity, firm and industry growth, and the like-are accounted for in the regressions. Providing explanations for interindustry differences in union profit effects thus remains a challenge for future research.
Estimates of union-nonunion profitability differences by year, presented in table 4, are based on the union coefficients from OLS ln(q) and Wk equations, estimated separately by year (identical to equation ( 1972-73 (and, to a lesser extent, 1979-80) , years in which average q and lTk are relatively high.12 This finding supports the thesis that unions engage in rent sharing with respect to demand shifts and disequilibrium returns (Hirsch, 1991) and that some risk is shifted from shareholders to labor (Becker and Olson, 1989 ).
VI. Conclusions
This paper utilizes a company-specific measure of collective bargaining coverage to examine the relationship between firm profitability and unionization. The results provide broad support for the hypothesis that unions appropriate a share of the returns accruing from profit-enhancing firm and industry characteristics. Union coverage at the firm level exhibits a strong negative relationship with company earnings and market value, even after controlling in detail for firm and industry characteristics. Union effects on profitability remained sizable throughout the 1972-80 period. Differences in the union profit effect across industry categories are substantial, however, and do not lend themselves to simple explanation. The evidence reported here confirms that unionization has an important influence on company earnings and market value and reinforces the conclusion that unionism should not be ignored in empirical studies of profitability (Karier, 1985) . Equally important, the results show that there exists substantial intraindustry variability in unionization and that firm-level measures of collective bargaining coverage are highly preferable to more commonly-used industry measures of union density.
The poor profit performance of unionized companies during the 1970s may also provide an important explanation for the recent marketed decline in union membership. As shown by Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990), employment declines have been concentrated among union workers, while nonunion employment has expanded even in highly unionized industries. Changes in industry demand explain a small proportion of the total decline in private sector unionism. Although the evidence presented here is consistent with the thesis that declines in union membership and coverage have been in response to the continuing poor profit performance of unionized companies throughout the 1970s, future research is needed to examine such a proposition more directly.
